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SATURN V SYSTEM PHILOSOPHIES

by
Ludie G. Richard
Assistant Director, Astrionics Laboratory
Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsvilie, Alabama

SATURN V SYSTEM PHILOSOPHIES
SUMMARY
The Saturn V launch control and checkout system is based on demon
strated advanced techniques. The system employs redundancy, repairability, rigid interface control, and a rugged and reliable central
system to meet Saturn performance and reliability goals.
Two computer complexes placed back to back and interconnected
through a redundant data link provide automated and remote control
functions for the system. These computer complex systems, developed
concurrently with the Saturn programs, provide essential functions
but are segmented to reduce the amount of equipment that must operate
during critical periods.
Display and control capabilities permit the operators to meet all
normal and emergency conditions. A digital and video display system
is capable of showing real time data concurrently with slides and closed
loop television. Ample data processing is available to support the
man/machine interface.
Programing methods have been developed that make the entire system
operate in automatic and semiautomatic modes. Programs for special
hardware testing and monitoring are generated as required.
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SATURN V SYSTEM PHILOSOPHIES
The Saturn V launch control and checkout system employs hardware
and software arranged and designed to meet stringent Saturn/Apollo
requirements. This discussion concerns that system, its capabilities,
and how it is meeting those requirements. The philosophies employed
are based on the present state of the art and not on any undemonstrated
performance of circuits or circuit elements. Care has been taken to
thoroughly cover every reasonable need of the system. Unnecessary
complexity in the name of "someday it may be needed" has been avoided
to preserve the highest possible reliability. Emphasis has been placed
on using that which will do the best job and not in doing that which is
fashionable. For example, relay circuitry is employed in the electrical
system where a relay does the best job. Solid state circuitry is used
where relays are not fast enough or would have to operate too many times
in the launch and checkout processes.
The launch control and checkout equipment for Saturn is divided
into two main categories. One is the equipment located in the launch
control center; the other is the equipment located in the mobile launcher,
which interfaces directly with the vehicle and the equipment located
permanently in the launch pad area. The vehicle is mounted on the mobile
launcher and checked out in the vertical assembly building, where all
mating tests and overall vehicle systems tests are performed. After the
vehicle has been mated with the launch control equipment and all systems
have been verified and made ready for launch, the mobile launcher is
moved from the vertical assembly building to the launch pad, where the
vehicle is checked out and launched. This requires that a minimum
number of electrical and mechanical connections be made, broken, and
made again in this overall operation.
The most critical period for the launch control system is the launch
day, just as it is for the vehicle. Figure 1 shows the launch-day mission
time that has been assumed in a typical Apollo launch. The day ! s activity
is divided into two phases. Phase I is an extension of previous activity,
in which all of the systems are verified and made ready for launch. During
this time, last minute checks of calibrations, presettings, and other
critical parameters are made. After Phase I, the mobile launcher is
vacated, except for the crew in the spacecraft. Phase II begins approxi
mately 4-1/2 hours before the first launch opportunity. During Phase II,
the general vehicle system is in a ready-for-launch status. However,
items such as propellant loading, system pressurization, power transfer,
purging, final launch sequencing, ignition sequencing, final azimuth
alignment, and presettings of the guidance system, and launch commit
(holddown release) must be accomplished. Launch opportunities are ex
pected to cover a launch window of 2-1/2 hours, the time during which
the vehicle can be launched and meet all of the flight mechanical con
straints posed by the lunar mission. All of the launch control equipment
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on the mobile launcher must operate unattended for a period of approxi
mately seven hours. Any equipment failures during this period of time
will result in a "scrub" for that day, because the vehicle will have to
be defueled before the repair crew can repair the failure. (While there
may be some exception to this defueling requirement, it must be assumed
for the general case.)
Because of the reliability requirements placed on the launch control
system design, the equipment in the mobile launcher must have a .99 pro
bability of success for the seven-hour period shown. In other words, the
system is allowed one "scrub" because of mobile-launcher launch control
equipment in 100 launch attempts. In the case of the equipment located
in the launch control center, the requirements are such that it must have
an availability which can be expressed as a combination of pure reliability
and limited repairability of .995 for the entire 15-hour period shown.
This represents one-half "scrub" per 100 launch attempts because of lack
of launch control center availability.
Four methods in system layout and operation have been utilized in
the Saturn V system to increase its probability of mission success. These
are as follows:
a.

Redundancy of systems and alternate mode operations

b.

Repairability through crew experience and applicable spares

c. Stringent interface control that involves divisions of system
and subsystem functions and proper interface functional design.
d.

A high "flight standard" reliability basic system.

The most common form of redundancy employed in various forms through
out the system is that shown in Figure 2, in which A and B represent the
system. During Phase I, each element works on a certain portion of the
problem so that both elements contribute toward accomplishing the task.
During Phase II, both elements are available to do the same job; a failure
in one element does not mean a loss of the total function. This method
of redundancy is utilized extensively throughout the system and involves
a minimum amount of switching to gain the benefits of the redundancy
employed. In both phases, all units of the system are working properly
and the effectiveness and capability of the system are doubled. Care
has been taken to ensure that no single functional element, equivalent
to A or B, is too large or too complex. Thus, each element is a reliable
unit within itself. Combining two such reliable modular elements to per
form a given function in a redundant manner produces a very high expected
reliability.
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Repairability properly used represents a very significant method
in ascertaining that equipment will be available when needed. Although
equipment should not require repair, the probability of failure in rare
instances does exist. If it is assumed that (a) the mean-time-to-repair
is much smaller than the launch window requirement and (b) the launch
window is much smaller than the particular system 1 s mean-time-to-failure,
a simple expression for the probability, (P), that the equipment will be
available at any instant of time can be written as follows:
P = 1 - MTR ,
MTF
where MTR = mean-time-to-repair and MTF = mean-time-to-failure for the
system. This simple expression shows that the actual mission time (which
in the case of the launch control center is 15 hours) is not really a
factor, providing the repair is made quickly, the system has been designed
to be fail-safe, and the countdown process can be adjusted to absorb a
small delay. The mean-time-to-failure is mean-time-to-significant-failure,
which is one that stops the countdown launch process. Here, again, redun
dancy will be employed during critical phases to increase this mean-timeto-failure figure. The mean-time-to-repair for equipment in the launch
control center, based on Saturn experience, has been assumed to be onehalf hour. On this basis, the launch control center system should have
a mean-time-between-significant-failures of at least 100 hours. The same
experience also shows that failures of the "quality-type, 11 such as im
proper soldering, broken, or shorted wiring, etc., are the most time-con
suming to locate and repair. Therefore, this one-half hour repair assump
tion can be made only with a system built to high quality standards.
The methods employed to increase the circuit reliability of the basic
system will be discussed when the characteristics of that system are de
scribed. These methods can be summarized by stating that methods employed,
as well as the basic components utilized, are the same as those employed
in the flight system.
The central launch control system controls the total operation. This
control is accomplished directly and through control of a set of subsystems,
each one of which is devoted to a certain task. The methods for determining
systems and subsystems function allocations and the interface.design criteria
will be explored when the system is covered in greater detail* Decisions
have been made to minimize such factors as complication in design and check
out, effect of engineering changes, intersystem interference, personnel
cross-training, and even organizational stresses that exist simply because
this is a large system which integrates technical specialties of many
different organizations. (This results in the type of reliability which
is difficult to assess, but which is very apparent during design, checkout,
and overall system integration.) Each subsystem is a controllable selfcontained segment designed to do that which special purpose hardware can
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do best, but not to duplicate the capabilities of the central launch
control system. Through this control, subsystem requirements not vital
to launch day activities have have not been allowed to increase the
complexity of the central launch control system. These requirements
have been eliminated through redesign or have been made the responsibility
of the subsystem itself.
To describe the launch control and checkout system, its makeup, and
capabilities, it is best to start at the center of the system. The func
tions portrayed in Figure 3 denote the capabilities of the central system
with particular emphasis on those functions performed for the total system.
All functions are performed either in the launch control center or on the
mobile launcher. The mobile launcher functions include those associated
with the space vehicle and adjacent fixed installation equipment, whether
that equipment is in the vertical assembly building or at the launching
pad area. In this figure, the functions of the central system are noted
along with the inputs and outputs to that system.
The two-way data link function shown is an obvious requirement since
the mobile launcher will operate as far as seven miles from the launch
control center. This link function will move two-way commands and data.
It must operate efficiently and very reliably.
The decommutation function is another way of saying that the check
out system and the operating personnel require a significant amount of
the total data available in the vehicle telemetry system. The central
system must employ methods to accept, sort out, and present to the equip
ment and the operators any required information.
Event timing signifies the evaluation of the time history associated
with any of the inputs and outputs to which the central system has access.
For instance, the time it takes a relay chain to operate, the time it takes
a certain voltage to reach a given level, the time of a given valve closure,
etc., are some of the times determined by the central system.
Computational functions associated with the central system take two
forms:
a. The normally expected amount of on-site computation needed to
prepare the vehicle systems for launch. An example of this is the real
time commutation of the required guidance system alignment and the result
ing guidance parameters when the system is tracking a non-earth-fixed
destination.
b. Comparing an existing condition in the system with a "should be"
condition based on previous computed or recorded conditions.
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The recording function shown is one of storing significant real time
data as they occur. It can then be available during the launch process
or for post launch evaluation.
The real time monitor process is the continuous examination of key
parameters in the system. This examination compares the system condition
with that expected. Any deviations are reported to the operator and such
automatic steps and corrective measures are taken by the system as may be
required by the mission rules for that particular event.
The command interpretation and execution takes two forms:
a. Operator inputs to the system through digital commands or through
on-off switch commands result in required actions in the mobile launcher
area.
b. Changes in state occurring at the input to the central system
at the mobile launcher area are treated by the system. In many instances,
these will be commands that require action in the launch control center.
The emergency sense and control functions sense critical items in
the hardware system on a continuous basis and take some immediate correc
tive action. Redundancy switching falls under this category. This type
sensing must also occur within the central control system as well as
sensing of inputs to the central control system. For example, the central
system will respond to a power loss by sensing that power loss, alerting
the operator, storing away all pertinent data that can be called up when
the power returns, and taking immediate steps to protect all inputs and
outputs so that no spurious signals during the power failure will change
the existing state of the outputs of the system. (During this type of
failure mode, the central system is arranged to allow the launch control
center to change the state of any of its outputs. Also, hardlines around
the system are provided to "safe 11 the vehicle system for the crew and for
the launch operational personnel.) When power returns, the central system
will pick up where it left off, after assuring that the overall system is
in a condition required by the launch personnel and by the associated
mission rules for central system power failure.
Logical control functions are associated with detecting input changes
of states in the system and causing another change in state to occur in
the same area.
The priority assessment function is one of making certain that the
most important happenings in the system receive attention first. For
example, if the operator decides to manually control any item also being
controlled by a test routine, the central system will honor this command
to higher priority than the execution of that particular test program.
This priority assessment function takes many forms. These range from
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detecting emergency conditions in the external equipment and causing
the emergency sense and control functions to occur, to the priority
assessments required to maintain good housekeeping in a system of this
magnitude.
The data storage function shown is intended to denote the require
ment to store a great deal of precalculated and pregenerated data so
that the central system and operating personnel have available information
when it is needed.
The self-checking function is necessary in a system of this magnitude.
Full availability of the system depends on knowing the operating conditions
of the system at all times. Any alternate modes of operation are available
once a failure has been detected by the operators or by the system.
Further requirements placed on the central system are portrayed by
the input-output requirements shown. The system provides conditioned
proportional voltage outputs to drive meters and special analog recorders
in the launch control center. In the mobile launcher complex, proportional
voltages are also available that serve as commands and represent error
signals etc. The discrete voltages provided by the system are 0 and 28
volt dc signals of sufficient power to drive relays etc. This require
ment exists in both the launch control center and the mobile launcher area
The central system is called on to interpret 0 to 28 volt dc changes
as changes in system state. The central system must signal-condition
these voltages to meet the internal logic requirements of the central
system. This input requirement exists in both areas. Similarly,appropriate signal conditioning and analog-to-digital conversion is required
to evaluate proportional-voltage inputs to the system.
Both areas of system operations require parallel transmission of
digital data to basically digital susbystems or devices. Bidirectional
data are exchanged in the launch control center where, for instance, data
are sent to and received from the spacecraft checkout equipment. The
onboard computer system in the vehicle exchanges data with the central
system in the mobile launcher area.
Both areas of operation require inputs from timing standards and
synchronizing systems.
It becomes apparent as the requirements of the system are discussed
that a function at the interface of the central system in the launch
control center has a counterpart in the mobile launcher area. A backto-back mirror image system results when like quantities are compared
in the two areas. From the equipment development standpoint, a similar
requirement exists. A high quality system is required on the mobile
launcher to meet the expected performance goals, and a similar high
quality system is required in the launch control center to meet the
overall availability requirements placed on that system.
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The launch control system (Figure 4) shows the general solution to
the requirements placed on the central system. Two computer complexes
placed back to back and interconnected by a special data link (DL) are
utilized in the central system. Having a computer at each end of the
data link allows a process which moves only significant data and avoids
unnecessary handling of insignificant data in real time. The digital
data acquisition system (DBAS) is the mechanism that provides decommutated
and conditioned data to the computer complex and to the display stations.
(This system will be discussed in a following presentation.) A mobile
launcher telemetry system provides significant data to the DBAS where,
in turn, these data are available to both computer complexes and the
operational personnel. These same data are also available to the com
puter complex to provide a direct access without the effects of commuta
tion that would be present if the data were to be received through the
DDAS. This is a redundant path for critical data during Phase II opera
tions. Providing DDAS data to both complexes enhances the operation of
the overall system during Phase I and offers a redundant source of data
during Phase II. The display station makeup provides a number of alter
nate mode possibilities during temporary loss of any one of the command
or display capabilities. The self-checking capability is enhanced by a
computer on each side of the central system. The data link is selfchecking in its basic operation.
A computer complex is shown in Figure 5. (Not shown are items such
as line printer, cardreaders, paper tape punch, etc.) It is made up of
specially-built interfacing equipment to do the tasks previously dis
cussed, plus conventional computer elements. Eight individual memory
elements are provided. Each memory element is 4,096 words. Seven
buffer data channels move data in and out of the memory elements. Each
of the data channels has been designed to interface the memory system
with specific input-output areas. The data channels associated with the
discrete input system continuously scan the input discretes and auto
matically write the status of the discretes in a memory block in pre
determined locations. These data channels will also alert the control
logic portion of the machine through priority interrupt circuitry when
they detect a change in input status. The control portion of the mach
ine is then free to operate on any given problem without having to inter
rogate the discrete input channels except when it is alerted. A similar
method is employed with all data channels to allow all elements of the
system to operate independently as possible. The data channel operation
is totally independent of the computer cycle operations (no cycle-stealing)
with the exception of setup and termination operations.
Information passed to the data link system is stored and reformated
in the data link terminal for transmission to a corresponding data link
terminal at the other computer complex. A data block transmission is
accomplished utilizing horizontal and vertical parity checking to vir
tually eliminate undetected errors in transmission. Redundant data link
systems have been provided.
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The discrete output system is triple-modular redundant with majority
voting on each of the output channels. Independent power supplies and
sources are provided for each group of discrete output channels. (A
backup mode also exists wherein the data link can drive the discrete out
put system directly in case of failure in the normal system.) This con
figuration avoids changes in the output commands during any emergencies
that may involve the computer portions of the system. If the computer
cannot drive the discrete output system, control of the discrete system
is available directly from the data link until the computer is brought
back to normal operating conditions.
The interface with the DBAS is accomplished through a memory element
in that system so that any given parameter data can be assessed immediately
by the computer without having to wait for the normal decommutation pro
cess. Through this interfacing method, the computer has random access to
all DBAS data. This memory element is identical to the memory elements
in the computer.
Two tape station systems are available through separate data channels
and operate in a redundant fashion where required.
Added storage of 32,000 words in each complex is provided by the drum
system shown.
In the launch control center, a data channel is utilized to interface
with the digital display and control subsystem.
Three timers determine time intervals and control the various system
processes. These timers also work through the interrupt system of the
computer.
The interface modules are special registers designed to interface
the computer directly with the functions shown.
Note that as the launch process advances from Phase I to Phase II,
more and more of the computer complex on the mobile launcher can be
eliminated from the active system because of the way the complex has
been segmented. It is possible during Phase II to reduce the amount of
electronics in the critical path to no more than that which would have
been required to assemble data for a "data link only 11 system. Redundant
access to practically all critical data is possible either within one
complex or within a combination of the complexes and the DBAS. Obviously,
the computer complex power supplies,a portion of the control logic, a
minimum number of memories, and the data link data channel must be in
operation to get full usage of the computer complex. Although this re
presents a small portion of the total electronics involved in the system,
it does point out the need for a basically reliable system. (Further
study of alternate modes of operation is being accomplished to circumvent
effects of failures in these modules.)
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The steps taken to maintain high reliability in the central system
are as follows:
a. Only NASA-specification high-reliability components have been
used in the manufacture of this system. This minimizes the effect of
discrete component failures.
b. Serial logic design has been used wherever possible, thus re
ducing critical part count.
c. No logic frequencies above one MHz have been employed in the
central system. This allows the full application of vehicle specifica
tions in the areas of soldering, wiring, conformal coating, radio fre
quency interference, etc., without impact on circuit rise-time tolerances,
power levels, and other circuit design reliability considerations. This
application of flight standards to the system gives added confidence in
the computer's survival during short periods of acoustical vibration,
lack of humidity control during mobile launcher movement, etc. In the
launch control center, this approach greatly reduces the "quality-type"
failures previously discussed.
d. The computer complexes and their interfaces utilize "operationby-exception11 and priority interrupt to reduce required system bandwidth
requirements and increase noise immunity. Transmissions up and down the
data link are of the summary and abbreviated nature significant to the
computer complexes on each end of the transmission but are themselves highly
efficient.
e. Worst-case design to military standards or better has been
employed throughout the system.
f. All building blocks of the computer complex and the DBAS have
been employed throughout the Saturn I, IB, and V programs. As a result,
performance histories of all of the modules have led to a system of wellproven building blocks. Mean-time-between-failure and mean-time-to-repair
figures for these modules have been generated through experience and not
just extrapolation. Elements used in computer and other logic circuits
have considerably varying histories when they are made integral parts of
large systems with thousands of interfaces to power-level circuitry.
Normal operation of the system requires frequent energizing and de-ener
gizing operations, which, in turn, affects circuit performance. The
R&D environment on early flights, both in equipment and personnel, alters
expected overall performance. Experience gained on computer systems and
other circuits that are functionally and electrically isolated is not
directly applicable to launch control systems.
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The general characteristics of the computer complex and data link
are given in Figure 7.
The launch control system shown in Figure 6 is an expanded view
that introduces the interface concept employed throughout the system
and shows the role of the electrical support equipment. The computer
complex operates most of the system directly, but some subsystem break
out has been necessary. Typical subsystems have been added to Figure 6
to demonstrate the interfacing and system-subsystem functional separation.
The electrical support equipment (which will be discussed in a later pre
sentation) integrates the entire launch control system, the vehicle, and
the fixed facility equipment at the vertical assembly building and pad
area. The electrical support equipment also provides power, special
sequencing functions, timing, and the display stations. The display
stations are shown broken in two major elements, the manual monitor and
control portion and the digital display and control subsystem.
The cross-hatched areas are interfaces that have been chosen to
reflect the interfacing criteria mentioned previously. The data link
system contains storage and independent transmission operation. The
computer complex loads the data link system; the data link transmits
the data. If it has not successfully transmitted the data after three
attempts, it alerts the computer, whereupon the computer can try again
or request a switch to the alternate data link system. The computer does
not involve itself with the internal operations of the data link subsystem.
In a similar fashion, the azimuth alignment system is operated by
inserting an azimuth to be achieved. The azimuth alignment subsystem
then drives the vehicle stabilized platform through an optical closed loop
system to the desired alignment. The computer monitors the fact that this
has been accomplished but does not involve itself in the closed loop oper
ation internal to the azimuth system. Any change in azimuth after that
process causes computer interrupt, and the computer will move back to
service the azimuth system. (Similar interfacing arrangements are utilized
with the other subsystems.) A slightly different approach is utilized in
propellant loading. Operations are handled in the same system-subsystem
arrangements, except that the data set into the propellant loading system
are transferred to the operator by the computer complex. He, in turn,
adjusts the propellant loading settings. Again, the computer monitors
the operation and alerts the operator of any discrepancy.
The manual monitor and control portion of the display stations
interfaces simply and directly with special circuitry in the central
system. This manual capability is provided to override the normal auto
matic operations, where necessary, to give the operators manual control
of the system during emergencies and to provide flexibility to the
operators in locating and verifying failures in the overall system.
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Because of these necessary capabilities, the manual displays portray
much of the critical data handled by the digital display and control
system and are, therefore, a lower level backup to that system. In the
case of the digital display and control system, the previously mentioned
criteria of not unnecessarily complicating the vital-function-performing
hardware or software come into play. The man/machine interface and the
need to drive twenty display stations independently,suggested the need
for a separate display system data processor. A small data processor,
especially chosen to do this -job, has been added to the display system.
The addition of this processor to the display system has not endangered
any of the functions shown in Figure 3 because it is not in the central
system; the overall system will not be uncontrollable if the display
processor becomes inoperative. However, the data processing associated
with data formating, engineering unit conversion, linearizing, etc., as
well as subsystem management is in the digital display system to provide
total display capability. The processor reduced the hardware in the
display system compared to a system made up of special purpose hardware
only. Competitive system designs were studied, wherein a single data
processor replaced the launch-control-center computer-complex processor
and the display data processor with equal capability. The result neces
sarily violated almost all of the previously stated ground rules and
resulted in greater, not smaller, parts count. This is because the two
machines in the system are configured to do their specific task. The
single machine approach greatly reduced the reliability of performing
functions in Figure 3.
Taking the single machine approach, but using two machines in a
redundant fashion, did not offer a worthwhile gain in reliability
because of the switching involved with the many interfaces to the con
trol system processor and the high part count in each of the single
machines.
The third approach involved an internal-modular redundant machine,
such as that used onboard the Saturn vehicle; but its functional cap
ability could not match that of the present two-machine approach.
All of the approaches considered introduced added complexity in
programing and hardware over the present solution.
The digital display and control system is shown in Figure 8.
Characteristics of the processor are shown in Figure 9.
As the result of a request by the operator or a program operating
in the central system, the processor receives basic data from the cen
tral system. These data are then adiusted, formated, and passed to the
correct refresh memory, where they are switched to the correct console
alpha-numeric and vector display generator system and displayed on the
cathode-ray tube.
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The video system can show selected slides or closed circuit tele
vision from any one of ten inputs on any selected console.
Overlay capabilities exist between these two sources of data and
information. A full array of controls is available to the operator at
each console. Each console can request and read the refresh memory
driving any other console. Likewise, any console can request and receive
any data so that the loss of console system will only require an operator
to share an adjoining system.
A hard copy system is available along with a television output of
any selected data.
Each console is outfitted with a keyboard and light pen controls
for controlling the display system and the communications with the
central system.
Programing efforts with the launch control system have been directed
toward the total system operation as previously described. Programing
tasks associated with a vehicle system that has yet to be launched are
made difficult, because much of the programing is in series with final
design release. This has required an approach in which programing of
a universal application is performed as much as possible. Then, as
special programing oriented toward unique tasks becomes available, it
is added to the basic general usage programs to complete the package.
Two types of programs are in use in the central system when the
overall system is in the launch control and checkout process. These are
the operating system programs and test programs. The operating system
programs make the central system operate as a single unit and service all
parts of the system. Complementary parts of the operating system programs
exist in both machines. In general, these programs can be considered to
be in seven components. These are as follows:
a.

Input/output control system

b.

Data link executive

c.

Interrupt processor

d.

Test program control

e.

Display executive

f.

Monitors

g.

Discrete executive
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An added capability exists in the operating system program which is the
automatic test or launch language (ATOLL) executive. ATOLL is a special
sequence language used by the test engineer to communicate directly with
the computer and not through a programer to perform routine sequential
testing.
The operating system programs provide the following system
lities:
a.

Total operator control with semiautomatic operation

b.

Automatic monitor of parameters

c.

Automatic display of parameters

capabi

d.

Event timing and recording of events

e.

Initiation of automated test

f.

Generation and utilization of automated sequence procedures ATOLL

The programs in the operating systems are written to utilize the
redundant capabilities of the hardware system and, in most cases, to
recognize the presence of a failure that requires the use of this
capability.
Special test programs are written to cover testing of the onboard
digital computer, stabilized platform system, networks systems, emergency
detection systems, measuring systems, flight control systems, etc. These
programs are called into operation by the operating systems program and
are interwoven with the other functions of the system.
There are approximately 100,000 instructions in the operating systems
program and the test programs planned for Saturn V.
Support programs, such as assemblers, compilers and diagnostic rou
tines, are also required for the Saturn V system.
All programs, systems, and their combinations are verified in the
Marshall Space Flight Center ! s System Development Facility.
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SYSTEM COMPONENT CHARACTERISTICS
Computer Complex Processor
Seven special I/O buffer channels (non cycle-stealing)
Eight 24 bit I/O buffer registers - 192 I/O bits
192 sense lines
192 control lines (output)
Eight priority interrupt lines
Memory - 32,768 words - core
32,768 words - drum
6 microsecond access
Clock frequency - 936 kHz
co
CD

Word length - 24 bits plus parity
Six index registers - card reader and punch, line printer, paper punch, and reader
Data Link
Transmission - 250 kilobits/second
Effective data rate - 133 kilobits/second
Command words - full duplex
Data words - half duplex
Two-dimensional parity check
-14
Error rate - 2,8 x 10
wore
words/word
(undetected)
Modulation - modified diphase
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SYSTEM COMPONENT CHARACTERISTICS
Display Processor
Word length
24 bits
3.8 microseconds add
6.46 microseconds multiply
17 microseconds divide
Word time - 1.9 microseconds
Clock frequency - 2.63 MHz
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12,288 words - core
.8 microsecond access
Input/Output
Direct memory access
Full buffered channel
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